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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
DOUGLAS L. SCHMIDT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, KENWAY ENGINEERING 
and INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16097 
This action arises from an application filed with the 
Industrial Commission of Utah seeking Workmen's Compensation 
Benefits. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon hearing, the administrative law judge ordered that 
plaintiff's claim should be denied. Thereafter, upon plain-
tiff's Motion for Review the Industrial Commission permitted 
plaintiff to file additional medical records and then, upon 
review of all of the evidence, the entire Industrial Commission 
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affirmed the order of denial as entered by the administrative 
law judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Defendants seek affirmation of the decision of the admin-
istrative law judge and the order of the Industrial Commission 
affirming that decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the facts as stated in the Plaintiff's Brief are 
incomplete and somewhat misstated or improperly characterized, 
defendants submit the following additional statement of facts. 
The plaintiff has experienced problems with his back 
and received medical treatment therefor by Dr. Hubert C. 
Burton since he was in the ninth grade about eight or nine 
years ago (R., p. 9). He testified that these problems and 
treatment continued up until about a year and a half prior 
to the Industrial Commission hearing which can be calculated 
to be approximately September, 1976 (R., p. 10). 
Plaintiff claims that he ceased having back problems at 
about that time which was just prior to obtaining the employ-
ment with defendant Kenway Engineering (R., p. 30). He 
started work for Kenway on October 24, 1976 and was assigned 
the duty of cutting pieces of steel into specific lengths 
for use in other areas of the shop (R., pp. 11, 30). 
At the Commission hearing held on March 16, 1978, the 
claimant testified that beginning in about mid-December, 
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1976 he noticed a stiffness in his back which, by January, 
1977 had developed into a definite soreness (R., pp. 14-16). 
He could not identify any specific occasion in which he 
experienced the pain or stiffness nor is there any indication 
in the record to show any particular activity in which the 
plaintiff was engaged at the time it first started (R., pp. 
14-15). 
The plaintiff continued working through January and did 
not go to Dr. Burton until February 7, 1977 when the soreness 
in his back had become worse. (R., pp. 15, 37). Pursuant 
to examinations and x-rays made at that time, the claimant 
was diagnosed as having a problem with his appendix and in 
March, 1977 his appendix was removed (R., pp. 17-18). 
Following a post-operative recovery period of about 
six weeks he returned to work at Kenway where he continued 
working until late June, 1977 (R., p. 18). In June, 1977 
he again consulted Dr. Burton concerning continuing problems 
with his back. Dr. Burton referred him to Dr. Affleck who 
performed surgery on the plaintiff's back on July 19, 1977 
(R., pp. 19-20, 84). 
The applicant did not give any notice of any claimed 
industrial accident nor did he make a claim for any Workmen's 
Compensation Benefits referable to his back condition until 
June, 1977 (R., pp. 13, 21, 22, 30, 32). At that time an 
Employer's First Report of Injury, dated June 7, 1977, was 
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prepared indicating that the date of injury was "unknown" 
(Exhibit B-4, R., p. 61). Subsequently, plaintiff filed a 
form requesting a change in physicians and, in describing 
the accident stated, "It is a congenital low back disorder 
that bas become symptomatic under the stress of lifting 
steel" (R., p. 78). 
The plaintiff then filed his application for hearing 
with the Industrial Commission in which he indicated that 
his claimed accident occurred in February, 1977. The 
specific date was left blank and the applicant claimed 
therein that he "developed acute low back pain" under the 
stress of lifting (emphasis added)(R., p. 2, 32). 
At the Industrial Commission hearing the plaintiff 
confirmed that the soreness in his back which he experienced 
in January and February of 1977 was developmental in nature 
and increased with time (R., pp. 16-17). He quite candidly 
admitted that he could not identify any event which caused 
his back to become sore. The claimant testified pursuant to 
questioning of his own counsel: 
Q. Do you recall any such occasion in which 
you experienced this kind of pain or stiff-
ness in your back. 
A. Any particular date? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Not exactly, no. (R., p. 15). 
-4-
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Then upon cross-examination the plaintiff testified: 
Q. In June, 1977, isn't it true that you were 
not able at that time to specify any kind 
of event or date upon which anything hap-
pened to cause your back to become sore? 
A. That's true. (R., p. 33). 
And on further cross-examination the applicant testified: 
Q. Mr. Schmidt, isn't it true that you really 
cannot relate the onset on your back pain 
to any particular event that occurred 
while you were working for Kenway? 
A. That's true. (R., p. 37). 
These admissions on the part of the plaintiff were con-
firmed in the testimony of Mr. ~rt Mann who had taken the 
recorded statement of the plaintiff in June, 1977. Mr. Mann 
testified: 
Q. (By Mr. Poelman) Fine. During the course 
of your conversation with him did you in-
quire of him as to when he first started 
feeling any pain in his back during the 
period he had been employed by Kenway? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. The month of January. 
Q. 1977? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you inquire of him as to whether 
he could identify any incident which 
caused the onset of that pain? 
A. I did. 
-5-
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Q. What did he say? 
A. He said no. (R., p. 48). 
Plaintiff's denial of any specific episode which caused 
problems to his back is also contained in the medical record. 
Dr. Affleck's office notes generated by his examination of 
the plaintiff on June 22, 1977 indicate: 
This is a 21 year old boy who has had trouble 
since February or before that even, when he 
noticed in his work that he was having increased 
back pain. There was not a specific episode of 
difficulty, only that his work was noted fre-
quently to cause pain in the back and in the 
right lower limb. (Emphasis added)(R., p. 76). 
It is also noted in the July 17, 1977 history taken as part 
of the hospital record: 
This is a 21 year old white male who had gradual 
onset on low back pain while working on the job. 
He did not think too much of it and he did not 
have a given serious injury on any one day--just 
noticed that he was getting progressively more 
back pain each day as he did moderately heavy work 
••• subsequent x-rays revealing spondylolysis. 
(Emphasis added)(R., p. 87). 
The only specific events noted in the record which 
could be identified by the plaintiff were the bumping 
of his knee on two separate occasions in mid-December, 
1976. He testified that on one occasion n •.• I 
stumbled backwards and caught my knee on the underside 
of the saw tablen (R., p. 13). He did not report that 
incident to his employer nor is there any indication that he 
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experienced any problem with his back in relation thereto. 
On the second occasion, a few days later, he indicated that, 
while walking past the discard pile, he bumped his knee on a 
piece of steel that was sticking out of a waste can (R., p. 
14). This event was reported to the employer, but again, 
there was no indication that the episode had any effect on 
the plaintiff's back. 
The plaintiff also testified that it is a normal occur-
rence for the employees to experience some jarring effect 
while handling the steel but such was characterized as a 
normal activity and plaintiff did not define any specific 
instance in which he experienced any adverse effects there-
from. Based upon this evidence the administrative law judge 
issued his Findings of Facts, Conclusions and Order conclud-
ing that plaintiff had not met his burden of proving that an 
accident had occurred. The Industrial Commission affirmed 
this decision after reviewing the evidence (R., p. 121). It 
is a review of this Order and the Findings of the administra-
tive law judge that is sought here (R., pp. 70-72); Appendix 
A1-A3). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUSTAIN AN ACCIDENT 
ARISING OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
In approaching its review of this case, the Court 
should not lose sight of the standard of review imposed upon 
the court by statute. Section 35-1-84, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended) limits this Court's review to a determina-
tion of whether or not the Commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers or whether the Commission's findings do 
not support the award. It is well established that the Com-
mission's Findings of Fact shall not be vacated by this Court 
if there is some competent evidence of record which provides 
a reasonable basis to support such findings. Evans v. 
Industrial Commission, 502 P.2d 118 (Utah 1972); Hackford v. 
Industrial Commission, 380 P.2d 927 (Utah 1963). Thus, this 
Court should not engage in an attempt to weigh or evaluate 
the evidence of record except to determine whether there is 
some competent evidence to justify the Commission's order. 
Likewise, the Court should keep in mind that the burden 
of proof or persuasion in an Industrial Commission case is 
upon the applicant and the Industrial Commission has the 
sole prerogative of weighing the evidence in order to 
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determine whether or not that burden has been met. Justice 
Wolfe has identified the applicant's burden as follows: 
The rule that pertains in respect to a factual 
situation is that the applicant has the burden 
of proof in establishing his case. If, after 
all the facts are considered, the Commission 
finds the scales in balance, the situation is 
left in equipoise and the applicant cannot re-
cover. In order to recover the evidence must, 
qualitatively and quantitatively considered, 
weigh or proponderate in favor of the applicant. 
Jones v. California Packing Corporation, 244 
P.2d 640, 649 (Utah 1952)(Dissenting Opinion). 
Applying these standards of proof and review, an analy-
sis of the record clearly reveals that the Commission acted 
within the boundaries of its authority and in accordance 
with the evidence and that the Commission properly found 
that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof. 
The principal issue in this case is limited to a ques-
tion of whether or not the Industrial Commission properly 
found, within the bounds of its discretion, that the appli-
cant had failed to prove that he had sustained an industrial 
accident as is required by the Utah Workmen's Compensation 
Act. If this Court finds that the Commission did act 
properly in finding that no industrial accident occurred, 
then all other matters and issues raised in the Plaintiff's 
Brief herein become irrelevant. 
Defendants submit that a careful analysis of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated April 
3, 1978 issued by the administrative law judge (Appendix 
-9-
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A1-A3) together with a review the record quite convincingly 
demonstrate that the judge, and the Commission upon review, 
ordered denial of the plaintiff's application based upon a 
satisfactory and thorough analysis of the evidence and a 
proper analysis of the law of this state. 
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act awards compensation 
only for injuries " ••• £1 accident arising out of or in 
the course of •.• employment •••• " (Emphasis added) 
(Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). It is thus 
essential under the Utah Statute that an "accident" must 
have occurred in connection with the applicant's employment 
before recovery of benefits can be allowed. 
The record in this case, as referenced in the foregoing 
Statement of Facts, clearly shows that the plaintiff has 
never been able to identify any accident which occurred in 
connection with his employment relating to the onset of 
his back problem. Such was very candidly admitted by the 
plaintiff to his employer when he first made claim for 
benefits in June, 1977 (R., p. 61), when he filed his 
application with the Industrial Commission (R., p.2), when 
he gave a recorded statement to Mr. Mann in June, 1977 (R., 
p. 48), when he gave a history to Dr. Affleck on June 22, 
1977 (R., p. 76), when he provided his doctor with a history 
of his problem when admitted to the hospital in July, 1977 
-10-
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(R., p. 87), and when he testified under oath at the Indus-
trial Commission hearing on March 16, 1978 (R., pp. 33, 37). 
Applicant's counsel has attempted to create a case for 
the plaintiff by making reference to the fact that in 
December, 1976, the plaintiff, on two different occasions, 
sustained a trauma to his knee. He asserts the possibility 
that such events caused injury to the plaintiff's back 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7). However, the record indicates 
that the plaintiff himself could identify no adverse effect 
on his back resulting from either of those two knee episodes, 
even under the pressures of leading questions propounded by 
his own counsel (R., pp. 13-15). 
Obviously, the administrative law judge and the Commis-
sion were fully justified in finding that the plaintiff had 
failed to produce evidence, beyond pure speculation, that 
the plaintiff had sustained any identifiable industrial 
accident which caused a back injury. 
Plaintiff's counsel further speculates that perhaps 
the normal and regular jarring effect to which all employees 
are subject in the handling of the steel may have caused 
some injury to the plaintiff's back (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
10-11). Again, however, the plaintiff specifically denied 
being able to make any connection between that activity and 
the onset of any kind of pain or stiffness in his back (R., 
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p.lS). It should be noted that the plaintiff's testimony 
with respect to such activity did not identify any specific 
occasion on which he sustained any trauma. Thus, the 
Commission was quite proper in not finding the occurrence of 
an industrial accident in connection with that activity and 
the Commission further acted properly in determining that 
the plaintiff had not produced any persuasive evidence to 
show a causal connection between that activity and the onset 
of the applicant's back problem. 
The plaintiff's arguments on this review are defective 
in two essential respects. First, the plaintiff ignores the 
standard of review imposed by statute upon this court and 
urges this Court to require the Industrial Commission to 
indulge itself in the plaintiff's asserted speculations. 
In this connection it is submitted that the Industrial 
Commission is not required to make findings in favor of a 
applicant based upon speculative facts. Quite to the 
contrary, it has the prerogative of weighing the facts and 
basing its decision upon any facts or showing contained in 
the record which constitute any competent evidence. 
Secondly, plaintiff bases his argument upon case law 
which is both irrelevant and distinguishable from the facts 
of the instant case. It is noted that the plaintiff places 
primary reliance upon the cases of Jones v. California 
-12-
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Packing Corporation, 244 P.2d 640, 121 Utah 612 (1952) 
and Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 503 P.2d 137, 28 
utah 2d 368 (1972). However, both the Jones and Elton cases 
involve heart attacks which were sustained by the applicants 
following their being subject to identifiable exertion and 
stress. Since it could be determined that such stress was 
the cause of the heart failures and since the stress was 
specifically identifiable as an event which occurred at a 
particular time and place within the scope of the employ-
ment, this Court determined such to be compensable. 
In the instant case, however, we are not dealing with a 
heart failure but rather with a back injury. 
This court has already recognized this to be a valid 
distinction. In Redman Warehousing Corporation v. Industrial 
Commission, 22 Utah 2398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) in which a 
back injury was also claimed, this Court stated: 
Petitioner strongly urges that Jones v. Cali-
fornia Packing Corp. supports his position 
that the facts in the instant case reflect an 
"accident" calling for compensation under the 
act •••• The Jones case has no kinship here, 
since it was an exertion case involving a death 
by heart failure as well as involving the con-
tinuing debate among medical men as to whether 
exertion and/or the degree thereof is a factor 
in causing heart failure. 454 P.2d at 286. 
The Robertson, Memorial Hospital, Hammond and Powers 
cases cited by plaintiff also involved on the job heart 
-13-
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attacks (Appellant's Brief, p. 11). In each case the attack 
or death was casually connected to specific work activity. 
There is no evidence in this case of any episode of 
overexertion or abnormal stress to which the applicant was 
subjected in connection with his employment and, most 
importantly, the record in the instant case is void of the 
identification of any particular event. It should also be 
noted that the Elton case does not involve a claim under the 
workmen's Compensation Act and cannot fairly be construed to 
be interpretative of the standards under that act. 
Another case upon which the plaintiff places heavy 
reliance in connection with this action is Purity Biscuit 
Company v. Industrial Commission, 201 P.2d 961, 155 Utah 1 
(1941). However, the Purity Biscuit case is also clearly 
distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. In 
the Purity Biscuit case, again, the evidence clearly identi-
fied the event when the applicant's spinal disc herniated. 
Such was identified with respect to time, place, cause and 
the connection of the cause to the applicant's employment 
activity. In the instant case, however, the record is 
devoid of any such identification. Moreover, reliance on 
the court's reasoning in the Purity Biscuit case is of 
doubtful validity since in subsequent cases this court has 
chosen to ignore that reasoning and in the Redman case, the 
-14-
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Court appears to have expressly rejected the Purity Biscuit 
case as noted from the following quote: 
As to the Purity Biscuit case, it has been a nub 
of contention in legal circles, but in its twenty 
year life span it has not been overruled apodic-
tically, nor given nourishment by an approbation. 
Purity enjoys the unique and doubtful distinction 
of being a living corpse. 454 P.2d 283, 286. 
See also, Mellen v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
431 P.2d 798 (Utah 1967). 
As early as 1922 this Court defined what was required 
with respect to the finding of an "accident" for purposes of 
recovery under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. The 
Court stated: 
What is termed an accident must be something out 
of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely 
located as to time and place. If the injury is 
incurred gradually in the course of the employ-
ment, and because thereof, and there is no 
specific event or occurrence known as the start~ 
ing point, it is held to be an occupational 
disease, and not an injury resulting from acci-
dents. Tintic Milling Company v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 206 P. 278, 281 (Utah 1922). 
(Emphasis added). 
This definition of accident within the meaning of the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act has been reiterated in the more 
recent cases. In the case of Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 
14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414, 415 (1963) this Court stated: 
It is, therefore, a prerequisite to compensation 
that his disability be shown to result, not as 
a gradual development because of the nature or 
conditions of his work, but from an identifiable 
accident or accidents in the course of the employ-
ment. (Emphasis added). 
-15-
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Perhaps the most definitive and helpful case decided by 
this Court dealing with this issue is Redman Warehousing Corp. 
v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 
(1969). In that case, a long haul truck driver noticed a 
development of pain in his back while driving between Salt 
Lake City and San Francisco. The evidence was that the mere 
sitting and driving of the truck precipitated the protrusion 
of the applicant's spinal disc. In its analysis, this Court 
stated: 
There is nothing in this record that shows any 
unusual event or "accident", if you please, justi-
fying compensability within the nature, intent or 
spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. To 
conclude otherwise would insure every truck 
driver, every railroad engineer, every airplane 
pilot and a lot of others, against a physiological 
malfunction or physical collapse of any of hundreds 
of human organs completely unproven as to cause, 
but compensable only by virtue of the happenstance 
that the malfunction, collapse or injury occurred 
while the employee was on the job, and not home or 
elsewhere. 
Probably the most recent pronouncement by this court 
indicating the need for an identifiable accident to have 
occurred in connection with an applicant's employment before 
compensation can be awarded is the case of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 
Case No. 15640, filed January 16, 1979. In that case the 
event which caused a herniation in the applicant's back was 
clearly identified as to time and place and such clearly 
occurred in connection with the applicant's employment. 
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However, this Court vacated an award by the Industrial 
Commission since it was found that the particular activity 
(rising from a chair to answer a telephone) which caused 
the herniation was a normal activity. 
Just as in the present case, the L.D.S. Church case 
involved no unusual activity or event which could be said to 
have caused the condition. This Court stated: 
The only facts relating to the claimed accident 
were presented by the testimony of Thurman, and 
there is nothing contained therein that warrants a 
conclusion that an accident ocurred. There is 
nothing in his testimony that shows anything 
unusual about his activities nor shows any unusual 
exertion or strain or that shows any contact with 
objects or a fall. There was simply nothing 
different about his activities on the day in 
question than on any other such working day. 
The opinion then continued: 
This Court has previously defined the term "acci-
dent" arising out of or in the course of employment 
as that which "connotes an unanticipated unintended 
occurrence different from what would normally be 
expected to occur in the usual course of events." 
The facts of this case in no way fit that defini-
tion. Simply because the first onset of pain 
occurred during working hours, it does not follow 
that there is a compensable, "injury". (Slip 
opinion, p. 2). 
Thus, the common standard adopted by this Court is as 
follows: 
1. The cause of the injury must be an event 
which can be identified with respect to time and place. 
Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 382 P.2d 414 (Utah 1963); 
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Jones v. California Packing, 244 P.2d 640 (Utah 1952). 
2. The cause of the injury must be an event 
which is out of the ordinary, unexpected and unintended. It 
must be different from what would normally be expected to 
occur in the usual course of events. Carling v. Industrial 
Commission, 399 P.2d 202 (Utah 1965); Thomas Dee Memorial 
Hospital v. Industrial Commission, 138 P.2d 233 (Utah 1943). 
3. The cause of the injury must be an event 
which can be identified as occurring within the scope of the 
applicant's employment. Nuzum v. Roosendahl, 565 P.2d 1144 
(Utah 1977); Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 454 P.2d 283 (Utah 1969). 
4. The injury cannot be the result of a gradual 
developing condition even though it is causally related to 
the employment. Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 382 P.2d 
414 (Utah 1963); Bamberger Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
240 P. 1103 (Utah 1925). 
All of the above standards must be met before an injury 
is compensable under the Act. 
It is clear from a review of the evidence in this case 
that the applicant has failed to sustain his burden of proof 
in respect to any of the elements, let alone all of them. 
The record identifies no back related event which can be 
specified with respect to time, place or employment relation-
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ship. The plaintiff is not shown to have engaged in any 
abnormal activity nor was he subjected to any unusual 
exertion or stress. 
On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that the 
claimant's back condition came on as a gradual and develop-
mental problem. In fact, the record indicates that no ana-
tomical change or breakdown in body structure or function 
is identified since both the surgical findings and the 
operation report and the discharge summary contained in the 
hospital records of July, 1977 indicate that the surgical 
procedure revealed that absolutely no abnormalities were 
found (R., pp. 84, 88). This evidence further negates the 
happening of any particular accident. 
Since no employment related accident is shown in the 
record, the Commission would have to speculate even as to 
the cause of the applicant's onset of additional back 
problems. Such problems could just as likely have been 
caused by or even just become symptomatic from the cold 
winter weather or by snow shoveling at home, by housework, or 
even a development following various automobile accidents in 
which the plaintiff had been involved during the two prior 
years (R. pp. 38, 39). 
The onset of additional stiffness or soreness in 
the back is just as likely to have occurred because of the 
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position in which the claimant slept in his bed as by any 
particular activity in which he engaged in his work. 
Obviously muscle or ligament strains or sprains are not 
limited to physical activity which occurs during one's hours 
of employment or as the result of employment activities and 
unless an applicant can show by some convincing evidence, 
the particular cause of such a strain or sprain, then he has 
failed in his required burden of proof. Such speculation 
is similar to that discussed in Redman, supra, where this 
Court said: 
For aught we know from this record there may have 
been any number of reasons why the rupture occurred 
when and where it did, based on circumstances 
quite foreign to the claimant's employment. In 
other words there is a complete absence of com-
petent proof here to support any finding with 
respect to the cause of the rupture, save by 
guesswork. In other words the claimant has not 
met the onus of proving an •accident• in the 
course of his employment that •causedn the "in-
jury" of which he complains, which brden is his. 
454 P.2d at 285. 
The mere fact that plaintiff suffered a back problem 
concurrently with employment is not enough. There must be 
an accident in "the coursen of employment not just in its 
"duration". Justice Wolf in the Purity Biscuit Company 
case , relied upon by plaintiff, commented upon this dis-
tinction as follows: 
The first requisite for the payment of compen-
sation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is 
that the injury which caused the disability must 
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have been employment connected. That is to say it 
must have been due to an accident which arises out 
of or in the course of the employment. If an 
employee is working and while working an outside 
agency inflicts an injury it is employment con-
nected because the employment has exposed the 
employed to the injury. But compensation cannot 
be paid merely because the disability or death 
occurred in the duration of the employment. "In 
the course of his employment" connotes more than 
in the duration of the employment. Functions 
performed by the employee in furtherance of the 
industry in which he is employed must be a material 
contributing factor to the death or disability. 
201. P.2d at 970. 
If the injury is not "employment connected" then the intention 
of the Act is destroyed. If all that is required is that a 
person suffers a physical impairment while he is also em-
ployed the Workmen's Compensation Act would become a medical 
insurance act for all employees. 
It is submitted that the medical records contained in 
evidence not only fail to aid the plaintiff in his assertion 
that an identifiable industrial accident occurred but they 
give substantial support to the proposition that the plaintiff 
suffered from a preexisting congenital problem. The applicant 
admits to such a condition in his request to change doctors 
filed with the Industrial Commission (R., p. 78) and such a 
representation is also contained in the medical report of 
Dr. Affleck dated June 30, 1977 (R., p. 80). 
It is also significant to note the representations of 
Dr. Burton in his medical report dated July 5, 1977 in which 
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he states npresented with pain in LS spine, when walking or 
getting out of a chair .•• " (R., p. 1). 
Thus, the Commission had ample evidence in the record 
to conclude that the statutory requirement of an "accident" 
had not been proven by plaintiff. The fact that the Commis-
sion chose not to believe plaintiff's explanation for the 
back problem does not give rise to error since the Commission 
was neither capricious, arbitrary, nor unreasonable in its 
action. Burton v. Industrial Commission, 374 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1962). 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAD NO DUTY 
TO REFER THIS CASE TO A MEDICAL PANEL. 
The statutory provision which requires the Industrial 
Commission to make reference to the case to a medical panel 
mandates such reference of only the "medical aspects of the 
case" {§35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended). 
Since the Commission denied this application based upon its 
finding that no industrial accident was shown to have occur-
red the medical aspects of the case become irrelevant. 
Before becoming involved in medical aspects of a case, 
the Commission must first resolve the non-medical questions. 
Many applications under the Workmen's Compensation Act are 
denied on the grounds that no employer-employee relationship 
existed between the parties at the time of the injury. 
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Obviously, if such be the determination, then the case can 
be properly disposed of without involving a medical panel. 
Likewise, such as in this case, many cases are resolved 
by a finding that no industrial accident is shown to have 
occurred as that term is properly applied to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act and thus, again, medical issues need not be 
approached which require the reference of such cases to a 
medical panel because a consideration· of the medical aspects 
of the case would be senseless as well as a waste of time, 
money, and effort. 
It is only in those cases where a claim is otherwise 
found to be compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act 
that the medical aspects of a case require consideration and 
reference to a medical panel is required. The medical panel 
may then address itself to an analysis of the nature and 
extent of injuries so as to properly assess liability for 
medical expenses, temporary total disability, and permanent 
partial disability. 
Quite clearly it is not the function of a medical panel 
to determine whether or not a compensable accident has occur-
red within the statutory definition of that term. Mellen v. 
Industrial Commission, 431 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1967). Such 
is the exclusive prerogative of the Industrial Commission. 
In any event, it is clear from the evidence in this case 
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that a medical panel would be required to engage in the same 
type of speculation as to whether or not an industrial 
accident occurred as would the Industrial Commission itself. 
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
Thus, nothing could be gained in this case by requiring the 
Industrial Commission to refer it to a medical panel. 
POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED NO 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE 
CERTAIN HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF 
A DOCTOR'S LETTER. 
At the Commission hearing the applicant attempted to 
introduce into evidence a letter from Dr. Affleck addressed 
to plaintiff's counsel and dated March 15, 1978 (the day 
before the hearing)(R., p. 53, Exhibit A-1). Defendants 
objected to placement of the letter into evidence on the 
grounds that it was hearsay, that it contained opinion 
evidence going to ultimate issues to be decided by the 
Commission and the defendants would, by its introduction, be 
deprived of their opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Affleck 
on its content (R., pp. 24-26). The administrative law 
judge sustained the defendants' objection. 
Plaintiff now asserts that the judge's ruling was in 
error based upon the provisions of §35-1-88, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) which provide that the Com-
mission may receive reports of attending or examining 
-24-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
physicians into evidence. 
In asserting his position, the plaintiff ignores two 
important factors. First, the statute referred to makes the 
decision of accepting physician's reports into evidence a 
discretionary matter with the Commission. Secondly, and 
most importantly, the plaintiff ignores the distinction 
between physician's reports and records generated in his 
normal course of treatment and a letter, such as the one 
which the plaintiff attempted to introduce in this proceed-
ing, which is obviously generated by counsel to a party for 
the purposes of litigation. 
Obviously, records and reports of attending physicians 
in hospitals generated in the course of treatment are clothed 
with a mantle of reliability, thus making their introduction 
into evidence less objectionable than other types of hearsay. 
As a practical matter both parties to the litigation have 
access to those kind of records prior to a Commission hear-
ing and either party has the prerogative of securing the 
attendance at the hearing of the involved medical or hospital 
personnel should he feel that further clarification of the 
content of the record is required. In instances such as 
that now under scrutiny, however, the defendants did not 
have that opportunity since the letter in question had not 
been made a part of the regular records and reports of the 
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treating physician and introduction of the letter would have 
prohibited the defendants from cross-examining the witness 
on the contents of the letter and the foundational basis 
therefor. 
Under §88 of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act it is 
clear that the Commission has discretion concerning the 
introduction of this type of evidence and there is no 
showing in this record that such discretion was abused. The 
judge obviously acted correctly to protect the rights of the 
parties. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no showing upon this review that the Industrial 
Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in excess of 
its authority or that it abused its discretion in finding 
that the plaintiff failed in his burden to prove that an 
industrial accident occurred which would give rise to the 
defendants' liability for workmen's compensation benefits. 
Quite to the contrary, the meaningful and persuasive evidence 
of record preponderates toward the conclusion that no acci-
dent occurred. The Commission properly refused to speculate 
and therefore acted responsibility and wholly within its 
authority and discretion. 
Having determined that the plaintiff had failed to show 
occurrence of an industrial accident, the Industrial Commis-
sion was then fully justified in refusing to refer this case 
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to a medical panel to evaluate medical aspects of the case 
which at that point were irrelevant. The Commission like-
wise acted properly and within its discretion in connection 
with its evidentiary rulings. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order of the 
Industrial Commission should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
r----I'Jy,.-J.}-;_ L-v( L j2_ __ 
Stuart L. Poelman 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Kenway Engineering and 
Industrial Indemnity 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
File No. lK654-82 
Case No. 12-77-8874 
DOUGLAS L. SCHMIDT, * 
* Applicant, FINDINGS OF FACT, 
vs. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
KENWAY ENGINEERING, I!lC., and 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
AND ORDER. 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Hearing Room, Utah Industrial Commission, 
350 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on March 16, 1978, at 3:30 o'clock p.m. 
Said hearing was pursuant to order and 
notice of the Commission. 
Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge. 
Applicant was present and was represented 
by Jay Meservy, Attorney. 
Defendants were represented by Stuart L. 
Poelman, Attorney. 
The applicant, Douglas L. Schmidt, began working for the Defendant 
Company October 24, 1976 with the principle duties of cutting steeL to 
various sizes according to orders in the shop. The steel pieces which 
he must handle vary in weight from a few ounces to 200 pounds. An over-
head crane is provided but is not always available since others use the 
crane as well which means, on occasions, the applicant must handle larger 
steel pieces by himself or with the help of fellow employees. The 
application did not specify a date on which an accident occurred but 
referred only to February 1977 and the applicant described the accident 
by stating: "under the stress of lifting steel daily I developed acute 
low back pain". He further alleged that a spinal fusion was necessary 
in the low back and that he was temporarily totally disabled from June 
22, 1977 and continuously thereafter. The claim was denied on the 
grounds that no accident occurred. The Employers First Report of Injury 
indicates the accident was reported June 7, 1977. The testimony of the 
applicant verified this. ; 0 
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DOUGLAS L. SCHMIDT 
AWARD 
PAGE TWO 
The only inciden!e the applicant could testify to was an 
occasion in December 1976 when he caught his knee cap under a saw 
table and hurt the knee cap without any lost time. A few days 
later he caught the same knee on a piece of protruding metal and 
mentioned the matter to one of his supervisors but did not have any 
lost time and specifically stated that he did not particularly notice 
any back problems at the time. As to handling steel he spoke generally 
about it being a regular occurrence to have someone drop one end of the 
steel and leave the other person on the other end to absorb the shock 
but related the matter generally to the shop and not to himself 
specifically nor did he report any specific instance in which he felt 
any adverse effects from it if it did occur. He stated he had some 
back pains later in December 1976 and through January his back was 
getting quite sore but he made no reports of the matter. He first 
visited his family doctor in February but there are no office records 
to show the purpose of the visit. Dr. Burton referred him to Dr. 
William Dunford who put him in the hospital for an appendix operation. 
Without the doctors testimony or the doctors records we can only presume 
that the purpose of this visit in February to Dr. Burton was related 
more to pains in connection with a problem appendix than it was for any 
other matter. On or about June 1, 1977 he visited Dr. Burton about the 
back pains and was referred to an orthopedic doctor for the first time. 
He was later admitted to the hospital July 18 for a myelogram which was 
followed by a spinal fusion operation. 
It is essential that the applicant establish that he sustained an 
injury as a result of "an identifiable accident or accidents in the 
course of his employment" as shown in the attached discussion. In the 
Pintar case which is cited in the discussion the court states: "it is 
therefore, a prerequisite to compensation that his disability be shown 
to result, not as a gradual development because of the nature or con-
dition of his work, but from an identifiable accident or accidents in 
the course of the employment". In the Redman case also citeel in the 
discussion the court pointed out that there was "a complete absence 
of competent proof here to support any finding with respect to the 
cause of the rupture, save by guess work". And further stated, "the 
claimant has not met the onus of proving an accident in the course of 
his employment that caused the injury of which he complains which 
burden is his". 
The instant case can be compared to both the Pintar case and the 
Redman case and the Administrative Law Judge finds that the applicant 
has simply not met his barden of proving that an accident occurred 
which caused the injury complained of. We further note that there are 
no witnesses, no timely reporting and no showing of a relationship 
between the injury and the work of the applicant. 
A-2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DOUGLAS L. SCHMIDT 
AWARD 
PAGE THREE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
-
The application should be denied. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant be and 
the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within 15 days of the date hereof specifying 
in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
~ April , 1978. 
ATTEST: 
Commission Secretary 
J?ei'th E. Sohm, 
Administrative Law Judge 
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